BLOGS AND BULLETStransaction costs for organizing collective action, by facilitating communication and coordination across both physical and social distance. The networked nature of social media may undermine hierarchical, top-down movements and generate new forms of lat�social movements.19 More broadly, new media may change the political opportunity structure by publicizing splits among the ruling elite, creating lines of communication for challengers to engage segments of the elite in new ways, or by drawing international attention to local problems. Yet another possibility is that new media will change perceptions about the real distribution of opinion within a society, so that others feel safer coming forward in support of a previously taboo position once they see how many online peers share their views. These possibilities point to several plausible research questions:鈻�鈻�鈻�鈻�鈻�Do new media reduce transaction costs for contentious political action Do new media create lat�rather than hierarchical networks of collective action Do new media more effectively create and disseminate focal points, such as the iconic image of Neda Agha-Soltan murder in Iran Do new media change political opportunity structures (e.g., by attracting international attention, exposing internal elite divisions and fissures, or by building new openings into the political elite) Do new media create different collective understandings of the distribution of societal opinion (i.e., change beliefs about what others believe)This level of analysis would most likely require careful case study research in order to assess the changes produced by the various proposed mechanisms.Regime PoliciesMuch literature on new media and contentious politics has implicitly assumed that these new forms of communication primarily help activists against regimes. But although regimes have often been caught off guard by new media activism, they have also responded by co-opting, shutting down, or overwhelming activists.20 Regimes may learn from the experience of other countries and increasingly act preemptively against particular new media forms when conflict might be brewing (for example, China blocking Twitter during a tense period shortly after the Iranian witter revolution�. Tactics at the disposal of such regimes, which often boast experienced and unconstrained intelligence services and secret police, include the direct repression of protesters (often facilitated by online records and identities), false-flag operations designed to disrupt opposition formations, interference with service providers (such as shutting down Facebook, Twitter, or even the Internet), and mobilizing their own defenders online. Such behaviors suggest these research questions, among others:鈻�Regimes may learn from the experience of other countries and increasingly act preemptively against particular new media forms when conflict might be brewing.鈻�鈻�鈻�鈻�Do repressive regimes learn about how to deal with new media from other regimes�experiences Is the learning curve getting easier for repressive regimes over time21 Do leaders actively use new media to react to others�use of new media, or both Can regimes use new media just as effectively as do citizens Can regimes divert attention from domestic challenges by using new media to whip up patriotism and xenophobia among their populations11
