272ARAB-ISRAELI MILITARY FORCES IN AN ERA OF ASYMMETRIC WARSBoth sides failed fundamentally in delaying serious negotiations for a permanent peace, although for very different political reasons. The DOP has provided that Israel would retain responsibility during the transitional period for external and internal security and for public order of settlements and Israeli citizens, but called for direct negotiations to determine the permanent status of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. These negotiations began in September 1999, and even a major effort by President Bill Clinton at Camp David could not move them forward rapidly enough to avert new major clashes. A new and far more violent Intifada broke out in September 2000. In spite of various peace effortsost notably by the Quartet (the United States, European Union, United Nations, and Russia) in June 2003 to create a �road map� for a al settlement, the most that could be accomplished was a faltering series of ceasees. The proposed date for a permanent status agreement had to be postponed indeitely. Major clashes took place, and the new Palestinian security forces became involved along with radical Palestinian opponents of Israel like Hamas. The Palestinian Authority came under siege and in many ways ceased to functiononsuming large amounts of aid money but failing to provide anything approaching effective governance or even an honest accounting of its actions and expenditures. Meanwhile, Israeli settlements continued, and Israel moved to create security barriers that would separate Israel, �greater Jerusalem,� and the territory it wished to keep on the West Bank from the Palestinians in both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.3 THE DEATH OF ARAFAT AND THE VICTORY OF HAMAS: REDEFINING PALESTINIAN POLITICS AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI MILITARY BALANCE The death of Yasser Arafat in November 2004 triggered new hopes that the peace process might be revived, and a respected propeace leader, Mahmoud Abbas, was elected President of the Palestinian Authority in January 2005. Israel and the PA reached new agreements on security issues, in an effort to move the peace process forward, as part of the Sharm el-Sheikh Commitments, in February 2005. Israel and the PA remained at odds over how the peace process could be moved forward, however, and new talks and cease-e efforts had little practical effect. Worse yet, the Palestinian Authority remained corrupt and incompetent and lost popular support. Abbas had little to offer the Palestinians by way of peace incentives and could neither effectively unify and rebuild the Palestinian security forces nor offer honest and effective governance, economic hope, or security. Israel continued to increase the size of the settlements in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, created more barriers and walls, did little to show a peace would offer real hope of a successful Palestinian state, and focused more on unilateral separation than peace. In September 2005, Israel withdrew all Israeli settlers and military forces from the Gaza Strip and vacated and destroyed its military facilities. It did not, however, give up control over the Gaza Strip waters, airspace, and access to the Gaza Strip.
